The Rescue of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility by Engbith, Lily S et al.
The Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 3 Issue 1 
2021 
The Rescue of American International Group Module B: The 
Securities Borrowing Facility 






Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, 
Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance Commons, 
Macroeconomics Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and 
the Political Economy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Engbith, Lily S.; Buchholtz, Alec; and Jeffereis, Devyn (2021) "The Rescue of American International Group 
Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility," The Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, 63-82. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss1/3 
This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and 




The Rescue of American International Group  –  
Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility1 
Lily S. Engbith,2 Alec Buchholtz,3 and Devyn Jeffereis4 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
October 10, 2019, revised: April 15, 2021 
Abstract 
In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations 
in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested 
much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed 
securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain 
for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit 
downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal 
Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing 
Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan as 
much as $37.8 billion to AIG to return cash to securities borrowers, accepting as collateral 
the investment-grade securities that AIG had lent to those securities borrowers. SBF  The 
facility allowed AIG to borrow funds to repay securities borrowers and mitigate liquidity 
constraints. Its operations were terminated following the creation of the Maiden Lane II 
facility.   
Keywords: AIG, collateral reinvestment, residential mortgage-backed securities, Securities 
Borrowing Facility (SBF), securities lending
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At a Glance  
Beginning in 1997, American International 
Group (AIG) started an in-house securities 
lending program whereby high-quality 
securities were lent out to counterparties 
in exchange for cash collateral (Peirce 
2014, 18). Its insurance subsidiaries would 
provide high-quality securities to AIG 
Securities Lending Corp. (formerly AIG 
Global Securities Lending Corp.), which 
would lend those securities to 
counterparties in exchange for cash 
collateral (Peirce 2014, 18). That cash 
collateral would then be separately 
reinvested by the domestic AIG Global 
Investment Corp. (AIG GIC) to generate 
income (Peirce 2014, 18). While this 
practice was seen as a relatively risk-free 
way to increase returns on corporate bonds 
and other stable securities, AIG began 
engaging in more-aggressive investments—in particular, residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) and other illiquid assets rather than the usual corporate and sovereign 
bonds (US COP 2010, 33-34).  
On September 15, 2008, three rating agencies downgraded the AIG parent company by two 
to three levels each (AIG 2009, 4). Despite the creation of an $85 billion federal revolving 
credit facility the following day, the downgrades triggered a panic among securities 
borrowers, who demanded repayment of their cash collateral in return for AIG’s securities 
(BdofGov 2008a; US COP 2010, 68). However, AIG found itself unable to meet these demands 
because it had reinvested the cash in illiquid securities (BdofGov 2008c, 2).  
It soon became clear that this repayment model was unsustainable, and AIG would need 
additional federal assistance to return cash collateral to securities borrowers (US COP 2010, 
68). On October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve approved the establishment of the Securities 
Borrowing Facility (SBF) by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in order to 
relieve liquidity strains stemming from the requests by counterparties to withdraw from 
securities lending agreements and get their cash collateral back (BdofGov 2008c, 2). With 
the SBF, the FRBNY made as much as $37.8 billion in cash available to AIG, enough to unwind 
all of AIG’s outstanding securities lending transactions (BdofGov 2008c, 1, 3). Counterparties 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To relieve intense liquidity pressures 
stemming from increased requests for cash collateral 
from counterparties that had borrowed securities 
through AIG’s securities lending program. 
  
Announcement Date  October 6, 2008 
Operational Date October 8, 2008 
Termination Date  December 12, 2008 
Legal Authority Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act   
(12 U.S.C. § 343) 
Maximum Loan Extended $37.8 billion 
Peak Utilization  $20.5 billion 
Participants American International 
Group, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York  
American International Group, Inc.:  
The Securities Borrowing Facility 
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received their cash collateral back and returned the securities AIG had lent them (US COP 
2010, 68). AIG then posted those securities to the Fed as collateral for SBF loans (US COP 
2010, 68).  
Summary Evaluation 
The creation and implementation of the Securities Borrowing Facility was seen as a 
successful intervention that allowed AIG to repay its counterparties’ cash collateral and 
terminate its troublesome securities lending agreements (US COP 2010, 69). The SBF did not 
address the mark-to-market losses on the illiquid RMBS in which AIG had reinvested cash 
collateral (Peirce 2014, 42). Maiden Lane II, a separate special-purpose vehicle established 
during the November 10 restructuring of federal support for AIG, would be responsible for 
moving these assets off the company’s books (US COP 2010, 71).  
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American International Group: United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
 
Sovereign credit rating (five-
year senior debt) 
 











Size of banking system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP 
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial system 
 
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial 
system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial 
system in 2008 
Five-bank concentration of 
banking system 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of 
banking system 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for 
2008 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World Bank, 









Beginning in 1997, AIG Securities Lending Corp. operated a securities lending program 
whereby high-quality securities were pooled from state-regulated insurance subsidiaries 
and lent out to counterparties in exchange for cash collateral, which was typically 102% of 
the value of the securities (Peirce 2014, 18, 21). To generate income, the cash collateral 
would then be reinvested by another AIG subsidiary, AIG Global Investment Corp. (AIG GIC), 
which shared the program’s proceeds 50-50 with AIG insurance subsidiaries (Hutchings 
2010). In the unexpected event that AIG GIC could not return the cash collateral in a timely 
manner, cash from the holding company and the assets of the insurance subsidiaries would 
be available (AIG 2008a, 108; Peirce 2014, 19).  
Traditionally, AIG would invest the cash collateral from securities lending conservatively in 
corporate and sovereign bonds, producing modest returns of only a few basis points (US COP 
2010, 33-34). However, in the years before the financial crisis, GIC employees began to invest 
in other long-term investments as a means of increasing their return on cash collateral 
reinvestment (US COP 2010, 33-34). AIG GIC therefore began reinvesting primarily in 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-backed securities 
(McDonald and Paulson 2015 , 85). By the end of 2007, 65% of AIG’s securities lending cash 
collateral had been reinvested in these types of assets (AIG 2008a , 108).5 
Under pressure from state insurance regulators, the company began to unwind part of its 
securities lending program in 2007 (Moriarty 2010, 2); the size of the program fell from $76 
billion at the end of 2007 to $58 billion on September 12, 2008 (AIG 2008a, 108; Dinallo 
2010, 16). 
As part of a multinational insurance group and financial institution, AIG insurance 
subsidiaries were subject to supervision by many state insurance regulators and other 
regulators across the world (US COP 2010, 16-17). The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
supervised the holding company on a consolidated basis because AIG owned a small thrift 
(Peirce 2014, 8). However, AIG was not subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve (GAO-
2011, 143). The Fed had been monitoring the company’s exposures and potential losses in 
subprime mortgage-linked securities since late 2007, but it was unaware of the company’s 
liquidity issues stemming from cash collateral reinvestment in RMBS (GAO 2009, 17; GAO 
2011, 18).  
The heavy focus on long-term investments in RMBS and other illiquid securities forced AIG 
to realize losses and proved to be a strain on AIG’s liquidity when those markets began to 
collapse in late 2007 (Peirce 2014, 26-28). AIG recorded net realized losses of $6.7 billion on 
 
5 These investments included corporate debt, mortgage-backed, asset-backed, and collateralized securities, and 
cash/short-term investments (AIG 2008a, 108). The buildup of RMBS was gradual, as the limits on 
reinvestment in ABS holdings was increased from 50% in 1999 to 66% in 2003, and then to 75% in December 
2005 (Peirce 2014, 23). 
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the cash collateral reinvestment portfolio in the first half of 2008, and the portfolio also 
suffered rating downgrades—the proportion of securities in the portfolio rated below single-
A was less than half a percent at the end of 2007 but had grown to 4.8% by June 30, 2008 
(AIG 2008a, 108; AIG 2008b, 111-112). At the end of June 2008, AIG’s total liability for the 
return of collateral equaled $75.1 billion, while the market value of its investments in RMBS 
and other securities totaled only $59.5 billion (AIG 2008b, 111). Thus, even if AIG had been 
able to sell its entire securities lending portfolio, the proceeds at market prices would not 
have been sufficient to pay off securities borrowers.6  
As AIG sought to reduce its total securities lending portfolio in 2008, it had to raise cash by 
entering new securities borrowing contracts on worse terms (Peirce 2014, 27-28). 
Traditionally, it had been able to demand 102% of the value of its securities (AIG 2009, 3). 
But in 2008, the company was forced to offer a haircut on the value of its securities in order 
to get cash from securities borrowers (AIG 2009, 3). Securities borrowers began to demand 
these haircuts so that, in case AIG could not repay cash collateral upon termination of their 
securities lending contracts, proceeds from the sale of securities would make the borrowers 
whole (Peirce 2014, 28). At some points, AIG accepted collateralization levels as low as 80% 
(from Credit Suisse) and 73% (from Barclays)7 (Hutchings 2010). Still, AIG would mark their 
securities to market daily and provide cash from the holding company to ensure that the 
overall book reflected 102% collateralization based on current market values, as required 
by state insurance regulators (Hutchings 2010; Peirce 2014, 27; AIG 2008b, 111). 
As markets roiled throughout the summer of 2008, AIG’s liquidity problems became 
increasingly clear to securities borrowers (GAO 2011, 19). In July 2008, AIG’s CEO asked the 
FRBNY to allow the company to access the discount window (GAO 2011, 19). The FRBNY 
refused, saying that doing so would worsen investors’ concerns about the company’s 
liquidity (GAO 2011, 20). Three rating agencies downgraded AIG’s credit rating by two to 
three notches on September 15, 2008, resulting in an additional $20 billion in collateral 
demands and transaction termination payments (AIG 2009, 4). To improve their own 
liquidity and reduce exposure to AIG’s credit risk, securities borrowers stepped up their cash 
demands (McDonald and Paulson 2015, 86-87). On September 15 alone, AIG made payments 
of $5.2 billion to securities borrowers (AIG 2009, 4). AIG’s lead life insurance regulator 
testified that securities borrowers demanded a return of about $24 billion between 
September 12 and 30 (Dinallo 2010, 17).  
On the morning of September 15, AIG also met with representatives from Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, and the FRBNY to discuss a syndicated secured lending facility in the form of a $75 
billion bridge loan sponsored by large financial institutions (AIG 2009, 4). These efforts 
would aim to provide AIG with liquidity relief until it sold sufficient assets to meet its 
 
6 At the insistence of local regulators, the AIG holding company provided a guarantee to the life insurance 
subsidiaries to compensate for the shortfall. Initially the company guaranteed $500 million; however, this 
guarantee grew to $1 billion and finally $5 billion (Dinallo 2010, 16). 
7 For instance, if AIG were to loan $100 million worth of securities through its lending program, it would 
typically expect $102 million in cash collateral. However, AIG’s distressed position would have compelled its 
collateral reinvestment arm to accept as little as $80 million from Credit Suisse or $73 million from Barclays in 
exchange for the same amount of securities.  
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liquidity needs and stabilize (AIG 2009, 4). By the morning of September 16, it became clear 
that the proposed private-sector solution would not come to fruition (AIG 2009, 4).  
Concurrent to the private-sector syndicated loan efforts by Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, 
the governor of New York announced a plan created by the New York state insurance 
regulator to provide AIG with additional liquidity on September 15 (Dinallo 2010, 19). This 
proposal would allow AIG to access $20 billion of assets from its insurance subsidiaries 
(Dinallo 2010, 19). For example, AIG’s property insurance subsidiaries had liquid assets 
above the legal requirement to protect policyholders; regulators would permit the AIG 
parent company to borrow these liquid assets in exchange for its less-liquid assets (Dinallo 
2010, 19). However, this plan was based on the false belief that AIG was experiencing a brief 
cash flow problem (Dinallo 2010, 19). Once it became clear that this response would be 
insufficient to resolve AIG’s liquidity issues, the proposal was dropped (Dinallo 2010, 19). 
On September 16, New York state regulators informed AIG that it would no longer have 
access to these assets and would be required to repay all loans made under the facility (AIG 
2009, 4). The arrangement was formally terminated on September 22 (AIG 2009, 5). 
As a consequence of these failed rescue attempts, on September 16, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve approved an $85 billion emergency Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) for AIG (AIG 
2008a; AIG 2009, 5, 201).   
Program Description 
By October 1, 2008, AIG had drawn down approximately $62 billion from the RCF (BdofGov 
2008c, 2). Approximately $11.5 billion of these funds were used to settle transactions 
involving the return of securities by counterparties (AIG 2009, 166). However, the situation 
called for more than a stop-gap solution to stem AIG’s liquidity pressures (BdofGov 2008c, 
2). In response, on October 6, 2008, the Fed approved an additional lending facility through 
which the FRBNY could engage in securities borrowing transactions with AIG (BdofGov 
2008c, 1).  
The purpose of the new Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF)—sometimes referred to as the 
Securities Lending Facility—was to provide AIG with cash to pay back securities borrowers 
that wanted to terminate their securities lending agreements with AIG (BdofGov 2008c, 2; 
US COP 2010, 137). The SBF would also alleviate the pressure AIG faced to liquidate RMBS 
that AIG GIC had purchased with securities borrowers’ cash collateral (BdofGov 2008c, 2).  
The FRBNY accomplished these goals by effectively taking over the positions of securities 
borrowers who were returning AIG’s securities (BdofGov 2008c, 3). The FRBNY agreed to 
make as much as $37.8 billion available to AIG to return cash to securities borrowers 
(BdofGov 2008c, 1). As collateral, the FRBNY accepted the securities that AIG had lent to 
those securities borrowers (BdofGov 2008c, 3). 
According to the initial conditions of the SBF, transactions would have a term of one day but 
could be rolled over repeatedly (BdofGov 2008c, 3). The interest rate equaled 100 basis 
points above the average overnight repo rate offered on the relevant collateral type 
(BdofGov 2008c, 3). The FRBNY loan was to have a maximum duration of two years (BdofGov 
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2008c, 3). By the close of business on October 10, 2008, the amount outstanding under the 
SBF totaled $10.3 billion (BdofGov 2008c, 3).  
Outcomes 
The Federal Reserve intended the Securities Borrowing Facility to provide temporary 
stabilization to AIG’s tight liquidity situation (BdofGov 2009, 17). The facility enabled the 
repayment of cash collateral to securities borrowers and relieved pressure on AIG to 
liquidate its RMBS holdings in a rapid and disorderly fire sale (BdofGov 2008c, 2). 
Additionally, the FRBNY stood in a position to replace all AIG counterparties, as it was 
“prepared to borrow securities to extend AIG’s currently outstanding lending obligations 
where those obligations are not rolled over or replaced by transactions with other private 
market participants” (AIG 2008c). Peak government exposure totaled $20.5 billion in 
November 2008 before the SBF was terminated with the establishment of Maiden Lane II as 
part of the November restructuring of federal assistance (Bdof Gov 2010). See Figure 1. 




Source: BdofGov 2010.. 
 
Following the launch of the SBF, securities it funded continued to lose market value, stressing 
AIG’s balance sheet and posing the risk of further downgrades (Peirce 2014, 42; US COP 
2010, 68-70). In response, the Fed and Treasury authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II 
on November 10, 2008 (FRBNY 2008). This new special-purpose vehicle, which was to be 
funded by a senior loan from the FRBNY and a cash contribution from AIG, was designed to 
purchase the AIG GIC portfolio of RMBS (FRBNY 2008; US COP 2010, 86-87). With the 
proceeds received from the establishment of Maiden Lane II, AIG terminated the SBF and 
repaid all outstanding collateral obligations to the FRBNY as counterparty to the SBF (FRBNY 
2008). The FRBNY then returned to AIG the obligations that it had been holding as collateral 
against the SBF loan (FRBNY 2008; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2010). 
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Finally, AIG’s entire domestic securities lending program was terminated with the 
repayment of all debts to the FRBNY (FRBNY 2008).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Securities Borrowing Facility was part of a multifaceted rescue package for 
AIG.   
On September 16, 2008, the Board of Governors authorized the FRBNY to enter into the $85 
billion RCF with AIG. By October 1, AIG had drawn down approximately $62 billion from the 
RCF, part of which was used to repay counterparties that settled rather than rolled over 
securities borrowing agreements. In light of this usage and evidence that “AIG was likely to 
face additional, significant liquidity pressures due to the expected decision by other 
securities borrowing counterparties to not renew their securities borrowing positions with 
AIG,” the Board approved a recommendation from the FRBNY to establish the Securities 
Borrowing Facility (BdofGov 2009, 17). (The facility was then still referred to as a securities 
lending facility.) The SBF was created as a temporary measure to “reduce the pressure on 
AIG to liquidate” the RMBS portfolio related to its securities lending program and maintain 
the value of AIG’s subsidiaries during the portfolio wind down (US COP 2010, 71; BdofGov 
2008c, 2-3). The RCF and the Securities Borrowing Facility were part of a large package of 
assistance established by the government to address AIG’s severe liquidity and capital issues 
(Massad 2012). In all, AIG-targeted government interventions totaling $182.3 billion would 
be funded by the FRBNY and Treasury, including loans, asset purchases, and capital 
investments (Massad 2012). 
2. The Securities Borrowing Facility was authorized by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343).  
The Federal Reserve Board authorized the FRBNY to enter into the Securities Borrowing 
Facility pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the board’s emergency lending 
authority. Section 13(3) had three basic requirements: (1) the Board must determine that 
“unusual and exigent” circumstances exist, by the affirmative vote of at least five members, 
or if fewer than five members of the Board are available, then by the unanimous vote of such 
fewer number,  (2) the loans must be secured to the satisfaction of the lending Reserve bank, 
and (3) the lending Reserve bank “must have obtained evidence that adequate credit was not 
available from other banking institutions” (Title 12 U.S.C. 343, 112). In determining that 
exigent and unusual circumstances existed, the Board considered that “as of October 1, AIG 
had drawn down approximately $62 billion of the RCF,” some of which had been used to 
repay counterparties returning securities that they had borrowed from AIG (BdofGov 2008c, 
2). In addition, the Board noted “the expectation that additional securities borrowing 
counterparties would decide to not renew their securities borrowing positions with AIG, and 
the continuing fragile position of the financial markets”8 (BdofGov 2008c, 2). This formed 
 
8 The Board minutes reflect the following detail: “The Board members' discussion of the proposed securities 
lending facility included consideration of (1) the current state of the financial markets, (2) continuing systemic 
risk to financial markets and possible risk of loss to the Federal Reserve from the disorderly failure of AIG, (3) 
the likelihood that no incremental losses would be assumed by the Federal Reserve, thanks to the high-quality 
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the basis for the Board’s determination that exigent and unusual circumstances existed that 
warranted approval of the Secured Borrowing Facility on the general terms presented before 
the meeting (BdofGov 2009, 17). It is important to note that state insurance regulators who 
were responsible for monitoring the insurance subsidiaries involved in the securities 
lending program also voiced their support (BdofGov 2008c, 2). 
Issuance of the loan by the FRBNY also required that the credit could be “secured to the 
satisfaction” of the lending Reserve Bank (Title 12 U.S.C. 343, 112). The Board minutes 
observed that: “The advances should be secured by high-quality investment-grade debt 
obligations that are owned by the insurance subsidiaries of AIG and, thus, were not available 
as collateral under the current AIG [RCF]” (BdofGov 2009, 17). As added comfort, the Fed did 
not anticipate any losses from the SBF because “advances made under the Secured 
Borrowing Facility will be with recourse to AIG and fully secured by investment-grade debt 
obligations” (BdofGov 2008c, 3). 
Section 13(3) also requires that the lending Reserve bank “have obtained evidence that 
adequate credit was not available from other banking institutions.” In authorizing the FRBNY 
to lend, the FOMC referenced that AIG had thus far borrowed $62 billion under the RCF and 
had used some of these funds to settle transactions with counterparties returning these 
third-party securities to AIG under its SecLending Program. (BdofGov 2009, 17)  It also 
considered the current state of the finance markets and conditioned its authority on the 
FRBNY  “obtaining evidence that the borrower is unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions.” (BdofGov 2009, 17).  Such evidence was 
apparently obtained by the FRBNY prior to entering into the Securities Borrowing Facility.  
 
3. The maximum size of the loan, funded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
would total $37.8 billion.  
The size of the loan was determined by the FRBNY to be large enough “to replace all 
remaining securities borrowing counterparties of AIG,” in the event that all counterparties 
in the securities lending program demanded their cash collateral back (BdofGov 2008c, 3). 
According to the filing regarding the creation of the SBF, “As of October 6, 2008, 
approximately $37.2 billion of securities were subject to loans under AIG’s securities lending 
program” (AIG 2008c). Therefore, the available size of the loan was set slightly above the 
amount of cash collateral owed to securities borrowers at the time the SBF was created 
(BdofGov 2008c, 3).  
 
collateral taken under the proposed facility and the additional protections provided by the terms of the 
proposed facility, and (4) the need to coordinate with the relevant state insurance authorities for AIG's 
insurance subsidiaries” (BdofGov 2009, 17).  
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4. The FRBNY loan was fully collateralized by investment-grade securities that AIG 
had previously lent to securities borrowers.  
Section 13(3) required that loans be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve” (US 
COP 2010, 56). The securities that AIG had lent to securities borrowers were high-quality 
fixed-income securities and easily met the Fed’s discount window criteria. “These securities 
that counterparties [were] giving back [were] high-quality corporate bonds—the kind of 
things we lend against,” a Fed official involved in the program told the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (FCIC 2011b, 5). 
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) noted that the quality of the collateral backing the 
Fed’s $85 billion RCF raised “difficult questions,” since AIG pledged its stakes in insurance 
companies that were difficult to value at the time and the private sector consortium had only 
days earlier concluded that AIG didn’t have sufficient assets to back a $75 billion loan (US 
COP 2010, 227). In contrast, the COP noted that the securities pledged for the SBF were “less 
risky and more easily valued” than the RCF collateral (US COP 2010, 228). The collateral 
consisted of high-quality fixed-income securities held by AIG’s insurance subsidiaries and 
included corporate debt obligations, agency pass-through certificates, collateralized 
mortgage obligations, and obligations of foreign and local governments (BdofGov 2008c, 3). 
5. The FRBNY applied the typical haircuts it used for discount window operations.  
According to the Fed’s Section 129 report on the facility: “All advances made under the new 
facility will be fully collateralized by investment-grade debt obligations that are subject to 
an appropriate haircut consistent with the Reserve Bank’s usual discount window lending 
practices” (BdofGov 2008c, 3). Data show the haircut averaged about 14% over the life of the 
program (BdofGov 2010). 
6. The secured borrowing transactions conducted under the facility would have a 
term of one day but could be rolled over for multiple one-day terms.  
The SBF followed the Fed’s usual practice in offering credit with a term of one day (BdofGov 
2008c, 3). The Fed’s discount window loans are typically overnight, although the Fed 
extended the maturity of discount window loans during the crisis up to 90 days (FCIC 2011a, 
252, 363). Prior to the crisis, about 10% of AIG’s securities lending transactions with 
customers had one-day terms; “substantially all” had terms of three months or less (AIG 
2008b, 112). 
7. The Fed used existing programs as a template in order to get the SBF operational 
quickly. 
Much of the SBF was based on existing programs, such as the discount window and TSLF. 
For example, the haircuts and one-day term applied to the securities were consistent with 
conventional discount window calculations (BdofGov 2008c, 3). According to former FRBNY 
general counsel Thomas Baxter in an interview with YPFS, the FRBNY wanted to utilize some 
of the features of already standing liquidity programs, in particular the TSLF, and not create 
new ones from scratch. “At the beginning of October 2008, we had fires burning everywhere 
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and part of the thinking was that we have to solve this new problem, but let's not try to 
reinvent the wheel” (Baxter 2018, 14). AIG could not draw on the TSLF because it was not a 
primary dealer; the Fed did not accept its request to become a primary dealer that came the 
week preceding its rescue (US COP 2010, 105). Since AIG had problems that were similar to 
those of primary dealers being addressed by the TSLF, Baxter said, it was natural to create a 
comparable facility, just one that worked for an insurance company like AIG and focused on 
RMBS portfolios (Baxter 2018, 14). 
8. The interest rate on the loan equaled 100 basis points above the average overnight 
repo rate offered on investment-grade debt obligations.  
The FRBNY conducted a daily survey of dealers regarding repo rates on comparable 
collateral in order to ascertain market rates (BdofGov 2008c, 3). The SBF then charged an 
interest rate of 100 basis points above the observed repo rates on loans it extended to AIG 
(BdofGov 2008c, 3). 
9. The FRBNY loan had a maximum duration of two years.  
The Fed stated that it created the SBF with the same maximum duration as the RCF “in order 
to allow the company to conduct an orderly disposition of certain of its assets” (BdofGov 
2008c, 3). While the SBF had a maximum duration of two years, it was wound down just two 
months later, upon the inception of Maiden Lane II (FRBNY 2008).  
10. The FRBNY announced the SBF on October 8, 2008, through a press release. 
On October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board unanimously approved the creation of the 
SBF (BdofGov 2008c, 1; BdofGov 2009, 17). Two days later, the facility was established, and 
the Fed announced its creation through a press release (BdofGov 2008b,  US COP 2010, 68). 
In the release, the Fed acknowledged the use of RCF funds to settle securities lending 
transactions, explaining that the newly created facility would “allow AIG to replenish 
liquidity used in settling those transactions, while providing enhanced credit protection to 
the FRBNY and U.S. taxpayers in the form of a security interest in these securities” (Board 
authorizes FRBNY to borrow securities from . . . AIG 2008). Because of the short duration of 
the SBF, a little over two months, there was minimal communication from the FRBNY 
regarding its management. On November 10, 2008, the FRBNY announced the creation ML 
II and the subsequent termination of the SBF (AIG RMBS LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions). 
III. Evaluation 
The SBF achieved its goal of meeting the immediate liquidity demands that AIG faced from 
securities borrowers (US COP 2010, 137-138). Implementation of the SBF did slow—and 
ultimately stop—the drain on liquidity associated with AIG’s securities lending program (US 
COP 2010, 137-138). The value of cash collateral that AIG GIC had reinvested in RMBS had 
fallen substantially in value (Peirce 2014, 26-28). The SBF provided an alternative source of 
funding for the high-quality assets that had been lent to securities borrowers (BdofGov 
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2008c, 3). Without SBF funding, AIG would have been forced to sell RMBS at distressed prices 
or find cash elsewhere within its organization (BdofGov 2008c, 2).  
However, the SBF was not designed to address the losses that AIG was experiencing because 
of the falling values of the RMBS into which AIG GIC had reinvested counterparties’ collateral 
(US COP 2010, 71). Only two months after creating the SBF, the Fed created Maiden Lane II 
to purchase the RMBS from AIG, thus removing the impact of their devaluation from AIG’s 
balance sheet. The FRBNY was in a position to hold the assets and allow for their orderly 
liquidation over time (US COP 2010, 71).  
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